Employment restructuring and flexibility in Austrian and Danish banking by Mayer, Gerit et al.
Gerit Mayer, Torben Andersen and Michael
Muller
Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck, AUSTRIA,
Århus Handelshøjskolen, DENMARK and DeMontfort University,
Leicester, UK
Employment Restructuring and
Flexibility in Austrian and Danish
Banking
ABSTRACT ▪ The literature on the impact of new competitive forces on
‘traditional’ industries in Europe tends to emphasize a rather unidirectional
line of development. Concentration of capital will pave the way for structural
adaptation leading to rationalization and redundancies. In contrast, this
cross-national study of the Austrian and Danish banking industries, which
have very much in common in terms of their contextual characteristics,
indicates rather diverse approaches to pressures for change. Even though
competitive pressures are similar, differences in employment restructuring
and flexibility prevail between the two national sectors.
Introduction
Debates about the changing character of the employment relationship
often centre on the assumption that there exist very few options for
development, and perhaps only ‘one best way’. Capital will eventually
concentrate, and the implications for employees are inescapable. Much of
the literature has focused on the restructuring process in what used to be
highly regulated sectors and has centred around deregulation and increas-
ing competition as the motor driving change. A breakdown of the bureau-
cratic employment model is often portrayed as a natural consequence of
these economic developments. The aim of this study is to uncover, on the
basis of a cross-national sectoral study, how the conditions of white-
collar employment are developing under these circumstances. Hence our
main research question is whether the same industries in different Euro-
pean countries are changing in a predetermined manner.
Banking is a particularly interesting sector to study because, as Regini et
al. argue (1999: vii), ‘although changes have swept through most industries,
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few examples can match the profound transformation of retail banks from
stolid, strictly regulated organizations epitomizing lifetime employment to
highly competitive enterprises with fragmented career structures and a new
focus on sales and performance’. It is widely suggested that financial ser-
vices around the world experience an intensification of competition and
face a more complex and uncertain environment. This is supposed to be
the result of market saturation, ‘disintermediation’ (the process whereby
banks are no longer the intermediary channel between borrowers and
savers), changing technologies, as well as deregulation and international-
ization of financial markets (Andersen, 1997; Canals, 1997; Dicken, 1998:
399–405; Muller, 1997b).
It is suggested that, as a result of the opening of the internal market for
financial services in the early 1990s and the current introduction of the
euro, these developments are particularly pronounced in Europe. For
example, the single market allows financial services to flow freely through
the EU and financial service firms to operate anywhere in the countries
of the EU (Dicken, 1998: 405). Therefore it is not surprising that for more
than a decade many observers have predicted a rapid convergence, in
terms of products and employment relations, within the European
finance industry (Bertrand and Noyelle, 1988; Botten and McManus,
1999: 15; Canals, 1997: 120; Dermine, 1990; Hiltrop, 1991: 37). European
banks are advised to increase efficiency (i.e. reduce costs), become more
flexible and to invest in new products and extended geographical markets.
For example, rationalization and restructuring are suggested to increase
efficiency by reducing employee numbers. Mergers and acquisitions serve
the same purpose, but could also be used to open up new geographical
markets. Contingent pay and outsourcing of service functions are sup-
posed to increase flexibility. An approach more oriented to marketing and
sales, the distribution of insurance products, a segmentation of customers,
a standardization of products, the use of sophisticated technologies (the
internet) and the introduction of profit centres aims to increase profits
(Muller, 1997b). However, at this point it is important to differentiate
between investment and retail banking. Whereas the former has already
become a global sector, the latter continues to have a primarily national
basis (Quintanilla, 1998). This study will concentrate on retail banking,
which in terms of employment is still predominant.
Considering the strong national foundations of retail banking, it is sur-
prising that in the current debate about the restructuring of the banking
sector little notice is taken of cross-national differences. Over the last
decade a body of research has emerged suggesting that, more generally,
there are nationally distinctive institutional arrangements, which are a
powerful barrier to the application of universal models of employment
relations and management (Berger and Dore, 1996; Hansen et al., 1997;
Katz and Darbishire, 2000; Lane, 1989; Muller, 2000; Whitley, 1994).
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Differences in the role of the state, corporate governance and vocational
training systems, or the nature of product and capital markets have an
impact on the employment relationship and lead to differences between
European countries (Ferner and Hyman, 1998; Locke et al., 1995; Muller,
1997a; van Ruysseveldt and Visser, 1996).
This suggests that employment relations in European banks may not
necessarily develop in one direction or converge, but that there are likely
to be different national reactions to similar pressures for change. We
would therefore expect the inner logic of white-collar industrial restruc-
turing to be at least modified by national institutional arrangements, given
that many cross-national and to some extent sectoral comparisons docu-
ment that contradictory pressures and distinctive national influences
exist. Our aim is therefore to provide a more balanced scenario than often
presented in the business and management literature. This article is based
on empirical findings from two national banking sectors.
The Austrian and Danish Banking Sectors
A comparative assessment of employment relations in Austrian and
Danish banks is a particularly interesting basis to test the universalist
stance adopted by most of the literature on industrial relations conver-
gence, both generally and in banking in particular. At least until the late
1980s both countries constituted almost the same ideal type. Both Austria
and Denmark are smaller economies in the European Union (EU), with
a very large majority of small and medium-sized companies (Hickson,
1993), and they are both characterized by a long-term business orien-
tation and by a stable political and institutional regime (Regini, 1994: 6).
Only a decade ago, the financial sector in both countries consisted of
several hundred banks, most of which were small and medium-sized. The
branch network in Austria and Denmark was dense, and both countries
were considered over-banked. Austria and Denmark both have universal
banking systems; in other words most banks offer the full range of
banking services. Although investment banking has become more
important over recent years, retail banking still predominates in the two
countries. In other words there was a rather similar point of departure for
the industry in both Austria and Denmark, before increasing competitive
pressures emerged.
Similarly, industrial relations in both banking sectors have been charac-
terized by a high level of institutionalization, with comprehensive collec-
tive bargaining arrangements, supported by a high density in employers’
associations and trade unions (Andersen, 1997; Muller, 2000). Further-
more, over the 1990s there was an ‘organized decentralization’ (Traxler,
1995) of bargaining functions from industry to company level in the two
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countries, which resembles similar developments in other sectors of the
Austrian and Danish economies (Scheuer, 1998; Traxler, 1998). However,
despite these similarities it appears that over the last decades Danish banks
have been more open to many of the universalist banking prescriptions
outlined above.
During the 1990s, the Danish banking sector was transformed. The
financial crisis which affected Danish banks in the late 1980s and early
1990s was the main trigger for change (Andersen, 1997; Sundbo, 1997).
As a result of increased bank debts and falling margins, profits fell to a
low level and in 1992 the before-tax profit of Danish banks was actually
negative (Table 1).
This crisis, and the advent of the single European market for financial
services introduced by January 1993, led to recommendations by the
government and advisory bodies for structural rationalization and the
formation of large-scale financial operations. This had indeed already
been occurring at company level: in 1990 six banks combined to create
Denmark’s two largest banks, Den Danske Bank and Unibank. Although
there are still more than 200 banks in Denmark, these two plus BG Bank
and Jyske Bank today control almost 90 percent of the Danish market.
Hence there is a relatively high concentration of capital in Danish banking
(Table 2).
In parallel to this concentration, the branch network was also reduced
significantly by the merging banks, signalling to the rest of the sector that
economies of scale based on rationalization and redundancies were a
European Journal of Industrial Relations 7(1)
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TABLE 1. Staff Costs and Profit before Tax in Austrian and Danish Banking
(Percent of Average Total Balance Sheet)
Staff costs Profit before tax
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Denmark Austria Denmark Austria
1987 1.46 0.90 -0.35 0.65
1988 1.46 0.91 -0.96 0.72
1989 1.32 0.92 -0.28 0.44
1990 1.27 0.99 0.27 0.40
1991 1.49 1.03 0.01 0.41
1992 1.56 1.06 1.20 0.34
1993 1.54 1.09 -0.65 0.49
1994 1.52 1.02 -1.00 0.42
1995 1.57 1.04 -0.14 0.39
1996 1.35 1.02 -1.23 0.43
1997 1.19 0.97 -1.05 0.43
Source: OECD, 1999.
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possible way out of the crisis. Furthermore, today there are no material
differences between types of banks. Sectoral demarcations between com-
mercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks have largely dis-
appeared in Denmark. In addition, a parallel concentration took place
among employers’ associations and trade unions . Today there is only one
employers’ association (Finanssektorens Arbejdsgiverforening – FA), one
trade association (Finansrådet) and one trade union (Finansforbundet)
covering all banks. The response to increasing competitive pressure at
company level was thus combined with a strengthening of sectoral insti-
tutions.
In contrast to Denmark, the Austrian banking sector is still, like capital
in general, rather fragmented (Traxler, 1998: 252). In 1998, Austria had
971 independent banks: in other words, about one per 8200 inhabitants,
whereas the comparable figure for Denmark is one per 27,100 (Mayer,
1998). As Table 3 indicates, Austrian banks are divided into five categories
or sectors according to their legal status. Each has its own employers’
association. Hence there are separate collective bargaining agreements for
the the 666 rural credit cooperatives (Reiffeisenbanken), the 72 savings
banks (Sparkassen), the 63 commercial banks (Aktienbanken und Privat-
bankiers), the 71 industrial credit cooperatives (Volksbanken) and the 9
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TABLE 2. Concentration Rate of the Danish and Austrian Banking Sector
(Percent), Measured by Aggregate Balance-Sheet Total, 1998
Two largest banks Next six banks Others
Denmark 60.0 27.0 13.0
Austria 28.5 25.2 46.7
Source: Finanstilsynet, 1998; Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 1999.
TABLE 3. Shares of Individual Sectors of Austrian Banking by Aggregate
Balance-Sheet Total and Number of Banks in Each Sector
Number of banks Percent of aggregate
balance sheet total
Savings banks 72 38.5
Commercial banks 63 27.5
Rural credit cooperatives 666 24.1
Regional state banks 9 5.5
Industrial credit cooperatives 71 4.4
Source: Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 1999: 42.
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regional state banks (Landeshypothekenbanken) (Oesterreichische
Nationalbank, 1999). Although there are today few differences in activi-
ties between these five sectors, the traditional institutional structure is still
in place.
As in Denmark there have been some large and several small mergers
during the 1990s. In 1991, two savings banks merged to create the largest
Austrian bank, Bank Austria. In 1997, the new bank acquired the govern-
ment’s share and independently held capital in Creditanstalt-Bankverein,
the second largest bank in Austria. In 1997, Austria experienced a second
big merger between two other major banks, Erste Bank and Giro Credit.
Furthermore, the government-owned postal savings bank (Postsparkasse)
was transformed into a joint-stock company, 49 percent of which was
sold to BAWAG (the third largest bank in Austria) in Summer 2000. At
about the same time a cross-national merger took place between the
largest Austrian bank, Bank Austria and the third largest German bank,
Hypo Vereinsbank. This merger was accompanied by a loss of codeter-
minations rights on the supervisory board for the works council of Bank
Austria. Therefore at the beginning of the negotiations the merger was
blocked by the employee representatives until they obtained concessions
which provided for job security for Bank Austria employees.
So far, however, mergers and acquisitions have not significantly changed
the Austrian banking landscape. For example, in contrast to Denmark the
number of banking locations in Austria has remained more or less stable
over the last 10 years (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 1999: 47). Whereas
in Denmark the introduction of the Single European Market acted as a
major stimulus for change, Austria’s membership in 1995 (much later than
Denmark, which joined in 1973) has not had such an impact. However, as
in the case of the debate in the Danish financial sector in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, important actors such as employers and the state have strongly
suggested that Austrian banks should increase their consolidation efforts.
Over-banking is suggested as a reason why Austrian banks are not amongst
the most profitable in the EU (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 1999: 48).
To be economically successful in the European market, many bank man-
agers, and also representatives of the Ministry of Financial Affairs suggest
that large banks are capable of servicing very large corporate customers,
but that for this it will be essential to bring down unit (labour) costs. Thus,
key actors in the sector seem to subscribe to a one-dimensional perspec-
tive, i.e. that capital concentration will lead to improvements in competi-
tiveness through economies of scale and economies of scope. Although one
might speculate about future developments, so far – as Table 2 indicates –
it appears that in terms of sectoral structure, Austrian and Danish banks
have reacted differently to global pressures for convergence. In the remain-
der of the article we examine whether this also applies to employment
relations.
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Employee Numbers, Profits and Numerical Flexibility
There are increasing pressures on banks to become more efficient. One
of the most popular prescriptions to achieve this is to increase economies
of scale by mergers and subsequently to reduce the level of employment.
To what extent have Austrian and Danish banks followed this line of
development; and if they have, how have they achieved their aims?
Table 4 gives an overview of trends in employee numbers in Austrian
and Danish banks over the last decade. The table illustrates that between
1987 and 1999, the number of bank employees in Denmark decreased by
22 percent, whereas in Austria it increased by 9.6 percent.
In Denmark, the largest banks were the ‘motors’ driving the changes in
the dominant employment model in the sector. Den Danske Bank (the
largest bank) introduced its first large redundancy programme in 1991
and later followed up with some minor rationalization rounds, ending up
with a decrease of 4500 people, which equals about 25 percent. Unibank
(the second largest bank) implemented three rationalization rounds
during 1992 and 1993, ending up with approximately 2500 fewer full-time
employees (about 20 percent). In Denmark, as in other more liberalized
banking sectors in Europe, for many categories of employees lifelong
employment is now a thing of the past. Traditional forms of employment
security, which seemed to be one of the foundations for good employ-
ment relationships in the banking sector, have been eroded (Andersen,
1997). Besides ‘compulsory’ redundancies, the reductions were achieved
by an almost complete halt in the recruitment of trainees. If there was still
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TABLE 4. Number of Employees in Austrian and Danish Banking
Austria Denmark
1987 67,612 53,411
1988 70,169 53,578
1989 71,480 52,902
1990 74,597 51,429
1991 75,979 51,098
1992 77,132 49,253
1993 76,162 45,905
1994 76,630 43,923
1995 76,257 43,004
1996 75,716 41,078
1997 75,244 40,433
1998 74,846 41,657
1999 74,775 41,787
Source: Finanssektorens Arbejdsgiverforening, 1999; Oesterreichische Nationalbank,
1999.
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an excess of staff, early retirement programmes were introduced, especi-
ally for old and low-skilled staff (Andersen, 1997: 33). However, Danish
banks have also tried to create opportunities for those already made
redundant, in order to maintain the picture of the good employer right to
the end. For example, in close cooperation with the local branches of the
trade union, HR managers created ‘job banks’ to help former employees
to find new jobs.
Table 1, which shows the staff costs and profits before tax in Danish
and Austrian banks, indicates that the reduction of employment levels
may have contributed to the steep increase of profits after 1992, but has
had no immediate impact on staff costs. In other words, cutting jobs is
not necessarily followed by a reduction of costs in the short-run, especi-
ally if the banks have used large incentive packages, and if the employees
staying (and being recruited) are the most expensive ones (Andersen and
Hjalager, 1998: 259). Similarly paradoxical relationships are observable
for Germany and France (Baethge et al., 1999: 9). In contrast to Denmark,
employment in Austria increased until 1992 and since then has declined
only modestly (Table 4). Even those banks which have reduced employ-
ment have so far been able to do this through natural wastage and early
retirement schemes. Bank Austria and Creditanstalt Bankverein, for
example, have reduced their total staff numbers by 15 percent (2400
employees) since 1991, but have not needed to impose any involuntary
dismissals. For the future, no change in this no-redundancy policy is
envisaged. In 1995 Creditanstalt Bankverein started a rationalization pro-
gramme called ‘Fit for Europe’. Within three years the bank reduced the
number of staff by 1000 without any dismissals. This was mainly achieved
by a generous early retirement scheme open to all women over 50 years
of age and men over 55; the bank paid the difference between the early
retirement pension and the regular state pension. Similar early retirement
schemes have been implemented in other Austrian banks.
Another way to reduce employment costs without dismissals is to
increase part-time employment, perhaps through job-sharing. Table 5
indicates that over the 1990s the ratio of part-time employment has
increased significantly in Austrian banks. The opposite trend for
Denmark until 1994 could indicate that Danish banks did not depend on
this form of employment to achieve numerical flexibility due to their
weak legal provisions against dismissal. However from 1994 onwards it
seems, that in both countries part-time employment has become a means
to increase flexibility. A question remains to what extent it should be seen
as a short-term attempt to gain flexibility or a longer-term structural
adjustment based on implicit strategic product-market considerations.
A further strategy to avoid redundancies in Austrian banks is rede-
ployment. A good illustration of this is the introduction of the Euro.
There are several types of banking jobs directly affected by this, such as
European Journal of Industrial Relations 7(1)
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foreign exchange cashiers and banking staff employed in the adminis-
tration and processing of foreign exchange transactions. Most of these
jobs are expected to be abolished once the Euro replaces national curren-
cies (FIET, 2000). The Austrian white-collar trade union GPA has nego-
tiated an agreement with the five banking employers’ associations, which
contains clauses that no employee will lose his/her job because of the
Euro. This is based on the assumption that before, during and after its
introduction, there will be extra demand for advice from staff because
‘Austrians are uncertain about losing their Schilling’, and thus the demand
for information will increase and will mainly be handled by the banks.
Former foreign currency specialists will undergo a retraining programme
and will be assigned to other jobs such as front office advice. This special
training can be seen as a job enlargement exercise and should result in
more skilled (flexible) employees (Mayer, 1998).
There are two possible explanations for the fact that Austrian banks,
unlike Danish banks, have so far avoided compulsory redundancies. First
of all, the scale of reduction has been much smaller in Austria. Neverthe-
less, the example of the two biggest banks suggests that even if major
redundancies are required, Austrian banks tend to avoid compulsory
measures. Thus a better explanation appears to be differences in employ-
ment protection regimes. Denmark has one of the most liberal legal pro-
visions in terms of the protection of employees. It is neither expensive for
the company, nor is it necessary to have a reason to make employees
redundant (Scheuer, 1998). This is different in Austria and in particular in
banking. There are special provisions for protection against dismissal in
Austrian savings banks. Employees with seniority of more than 10 years
have the right to switch to an interminable employment contract. These
contracts make it practically impossible for banks to make such employ-
ees redundant. Joint-stock banks have another provision stated in the
collective agreements, a so-called Administrativ-pension. In the case of
compulsory redundancies, employees with seniority of more than 15
years have the right to a monthly pension, if they are too young to qualify
for a state pension. Hence banks encounter serious problems if they want
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TABLE 5. Part-Time Employment in Austrian and Danish Banking: Percentage
of Total Employees
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Denmark 13.6 13.5 13.7 12.0 12.0 12.7 12.8 13.0 13.4
Austria 9.2 10.4 10.4 10.8 11.3 11.4 11.7 12.0 12.5
Source: Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten, 2000; Finanssektorens
Arbejdsgiverforening, 1999.
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to dismiss long-service employees. In contrast, the formal rules for redun-
dancies makes it relatively easy for Danish banks to reduce the number
of employees.
All in all, it appears that labour law provisions regulating dismissals and
the terms of collective agreements have a major impact on the way ratio-
nalizations are handled in Austria. However, extensive scope for various
forms of flexibility could function as a supplement or an alternative to
rationalizations and redundancies. Do Austrian banks possess more flexi-
bility than Danish banks in relation to their employees in key areas such
as pay and working hours?
Pay and Working Time Flexibility
Pay and working time have traditionally been bargaining themes in both
countries, and at the same time been a central focus of the flexibility litera-
ture. These are therefore critical issues through which to explore the
extent of institutional persistence (on the side of employers’ organizations
or trade unions), company level pressures for transformation, and hence
the dynamics of convergence or differentiation.
Starting with pay, systems in both countries are built on industry-wide
collective agreements, and they are highly structured and work through
meritocratic mechanisms (Scheuer, 1998; Traxler, 1998). Collective bar-
gaining regulates salary levels, bonuses, weekly working hours, holidays,
sickness provisions and pension schemes. The basis for remuneration is
in many respects the same in each country: according to their length of
service and professional qualifications, employees are placed in a specific
salary grade.
However, a more detailed comparison demonstrates that there are
important differences. Whereas in Austria all employees with the excep-
tion of executive staff are covered by the same sectoral agreement, in
Denmark there are sub-agreements for bank clerks, other employees and
executive staff, leaving room for more specialized demands from employ-
ers as well as employees. In addition, Austrian bank employees are paid
on an incremental scale and receive an automatic annual salary increase,
which rewards length of service. The overall remuneration system for the
banking sector is thus mainly based on seniority. Monthly salary is paid
up to 16 times a year for all employees, to include extra salaries (Urlaubs-
geld) and ‘Christmas salaries’. This is an achievement won by the trade
union and is not universal in Austria. Another distinctive feature is that
Austrian collective agreements determine the annual increase in all
salaries and not only minimum pay rates. This provision limits the scope
for employers to offset industry-wide mandatory increases against their
own higher in-house-rates (Incomes Data Services, 1996: 16). By contrast,
European Journal of Industrial Relations 7(1)
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the Danish system is somewhat more differentiated and seniority is less
important than in Austria.
In addition, Austrian collective agreements provide for bonuses, which
are guaranteed until the employee is promoted to a higher salary bracket.
The extent and value of these bonuses increases with the hierarchical level.
For example, the management bonus in one of the Austrian banks studied
by Muller (2000) depends on the qualifications of a manager’s subordi-
nates. However, the bonuses are not only designed as an incentive, but
also and in most cases as a means to fill the gap between minimum pay
rates and market requirements. In addition, HR departments have the
possibility of rewarding a particular achievement with a special lump sum.
Performance-related pay was recently demanded by all six employers’
associations and was an issue during the last negotiating round, but so far
no agreement has been reached with the trade union.
In this respect Denmark again appears to follow more closely ‘univer-
salist’ prescriptions for individual performance-related pay systems. Since
1997 Danish banks have had the option to negotiate salaries at company
level. The new system meets employer’s demands for salaries related to
individual, unit or company performance (FA, 1997: 2). Hence Danish
banks possess not only the possibility to decentralize pay completely to
the company level, but also the opportunity to introduce a highly per-
formance-related pay system. Whereas Danish bank managers were for
some time reluctant to introduce this new system negotiated on their
behalf, at the end of 1999 two of the largest banks adopted it, bringing
half the employees in the sector within the scope of new pay criteria.
Comparisons with other countries such as Sweden and Germany have
shown that the Austrian collective bargaining system is particularly rigid
(Muller, 2000), and this finding is reinforced by the present comparison
with Denmark. Austrian bank managers enjoy less flexibility in defining
pay arrangements for their employees than do their counterparts in
Denmark. However, pressures from the employers’ associations may
lead towards more performance-oriented pay systems in Austria in the
future.
Considering working hours, both Austrian and Danish employers
seem to have increased flexibility in recent years. As is the case in other
sectors, the working week of Danish bank employees is 37 hours
(Scheuer, 1999). This is less than in Austrian banks, where the collective
agreements prescribe 38.5 hours. Both the Austrian and Danish agree-
ments enable firms to operate flexitime arrangements at company level. It
appears that many Danish and Austrian banks have introduced such
systems. For example, core working time, when every employee must be
present, may be between 10 am and 3 pm, with work schedules outside
these hours to be negotiated at workplace level. Some Austrian banks,
such as Erste Bank and a regional savings bank, the Tiroler Sparkasse, have
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gone one step further, adopting a system without any core working hours
and no formal system to measure attendance. Employees come and go
according to their and the bank’s demands. In this case, line managers
have taken over responsibility for the coordination of their employees’
working hours.
In most European countries the opening hours of bank branches have
traditionally been highly regulated, as a result of pressures both from
within the sector and by national legislation. In most banks, the issue of
opening hours has consequently been dominated by a combination of
collective agreements and national legislation (Andersen, 1998: 9). This is
also true for Austria and Denmark, though it is interesting to note that
the bargaining parties are given more autonomy in Denmark. Since 1997
the collective agreement allows up to five percent of branch employees to
work on Saturdays between 8.45 a.m. and 4.15 p.m. This has to be agreed
with the staff organization or the shop steward. However, Danish bank
employers had to concede a sixth week holiday (optional, employees can
take extra pay instead, should they so wish) to obtain the option of
Saturday opening. Nevertheless, so far the demand from customers has
not been large enough to justify opening branches on Saturday. In con-
trast, in Austria, Saturdays are not considered working days, except for
bank employees working on shifts and in some tourist regions.
In conclusion, Austrian and Danish banks have similar flexibility in
terms of working hours. Nevertheless, when considering the new possi-
bilities in the Danish collective agreements for Saturday opening, it
appears that the potential for working hours flexibility is higher in
Denmark. The evidence presented so far suggests that the institutional
environment limits Austrian banks to such an extent that in terms of
employee numbers, pay and working hours they are less flexible than
Danish banks. This might change in the future, as Austrian banks are
increasingly using outsourcing to overcome these restrictions. Over
recent years, outsourcing has become more and more popular in the Aus-
trian banking sector. In this respect Austria is developing in a similar way
to France, Spain and The Netherlands (Dressen, 1999; Miguélez et al.,
1999; Visser and Jongen, 1999). The main fields of outsourcing in Austria
have been electronic data processing, transaction of payments and sales.
In respect of sales one important example in Austria is mobiler Vertrieb
(mobile distribution). This means moving advice away from branches
with strict opening hours towards individual service at whatever time the
customer chooses. In most cases, employees are not working under one
of the collective agreement for banks. Instead, they are embedded in other
agreements, mostly in that for the retail sector, in which terms and con-
ditions are less favourable for employees. Thus advisors can be paid a low
basic salary with the option of a high commission. Another way banks
have found to outsource sales are to open so-called ‘bank shops’. These
European Journal of Industrial Relations 7(1)
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outlets provide similar services to those in a normal branch office, but
have the opening hours of the supermarkets and shopping malls in which
they are located, for example 9 to 5 on Saturday. The employees are again
not covered by one of the banking agreements, but by that for the retail
sector.
Conclusions
This study illustrates how the same sector in two countries, which until
the early 1990s in many respects had similar features, reacted to a some-
what similar external demand for change. The immediate reaction in
Austrian as well as in Danish banking was to promote concentration.
The logic that capital has to acquire size in order to become competitive,
and that this can only take place through mergers, is probably more pro-
found in financial services than in other sectors. Acquiring size has taken
place either through larger merger waves as in the Danish case, or
through more subtle and smooth processes, as in Austria. The impli-
cations for employees seem to vary significantly according to the two
routes.
In the early 1990s, the Danish financial sector was confronted with
large financial problems, the advent of the Single European Market and
the expectation of increasing foreign competition. It reacted with large-
scale compulsory redundancies. In Austria, the financial situation has
been very stable over the last 10 years and labour turnover has always
been at a rather low level. In Denmark, the combination of economic
crisis, recent mergers between the largest financial institutions and very
liberal legal provision in terms of employment security, seems to have
acted as a mechanism leading to an extended use of numerical flexibility.
In Austria the legal provisions make it more difficult to make employ-
ees redundant, and thus bank managers are looking for other solutions
such as redeployment and early retirement.
The question is however whether the lack of flexibility in respect of
numerical flexibility in the Austrian system could result in increased use
of other types of flexibility. In terms of pay and working hours, the legal
framework of Austrian industrial relations does not provide banks with
more flexibility than Danish banks possess. Instead, recent developments
in Denmark, such as the introduction of a decentralized, flexible and per-
formance-based salary system and the option to open on Saturdays, seem
to increase the flexibility gap between the two sectors even further.
However, Austrian banks are to an increasing extent using outsourcing as
an option to achieve more flexibility. For certain types of businesses, staff
are employed who are not covered by one of the collective agreements
for banks, but instead, for example, by that for the retail sector. The latter
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provides less employment security, fewer restrictions on working hours
and the option to pay a smaller basic salary.
It is tempting to argue that Austria is just a late developer (Dore, 1986),
which implies that sooner or later the Austrian banks will follow the
more typical ‘European’ developments (as in Danish banking). However,
taking into consideration that outsourcing (or avoidance of insourcing)
is already a widespread practice in Austrian banking, whereas this is not
the case in Danish banking, it is necessary to provide a more complex
model of development. This is a model where combinations of changes
are taking place, where different types of flexibility are introduced at
different levels, depending on situational factors as well as institutional
features. It is therefore necessary to abandon any supposed automatic
link between the changing competitive environment and internal
employment conditions. Rather, we endorse the comments of Regini,
who states (1999: 326) that ‘markets, technology and institutions should
be seen in an interactive way.
All in all, the case of employment restructuring and flexibility in Aus-
trian and Danish banks refutes the notion of a one-dimensional line of
development for traditional white-collar industries. Instead it supports
those who suggest that convergence and divergence happen simul-
taneously (Katz and Darbishire, 2000; Muller, 2000). Hence our results
challenge the proposition that there is a cross-national convergence
taking place at sectoral level. However, speculating on whether this may
differ from sector to sector, production integration seems to be an
important factor. In the motor industry where there is a high integration
of research and development, production and distribution, employment
practices are becoming more similar across national borders (MacDuffie,
1995), as they are shaped by the nature of the particular business
(Marginson, 2000: 19; Marginson and Sisson, 1994). In contrast, there is
continuing diversity in a sector such as retail banking, which is still not
integrated across borders.
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